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EMOTION AND COPING IN THE AFTERMATH OF MEDICAL ERROR: A CROSS 
COUNTRY EXPLORATION  
 
Abstract  
Objectives: Making a medical error can have serious implications for clinician wellbeing, 
affecting the quality and safety of patient care.  Despite an advancing literature base, cross-
country exploration of this experience is limited and a paucity of studies has examined the 
coping strategies used by clinicians.  A greater understanding of clinicians’ responses to 
making an error, the factors that may influence these, and the various coping strategies used 
are all essential for providing effective clinician support and ensuring optimal outcomes.  
The objectives were therefore to investigate a) the professional or personal disruption 
experienced after making an error, b) the emotional response and coping strategies used, c) 
the relationship between emotions and coping strategy selection, d) influential factors in 
clinicians’ responses, and e) perceptions of organisational support.  
Methods: A cross-sectional, cross-country survey of 265 physicians and nurses was 
undertaken in two large teaching hospitals in the UK and USA. 
Results: Professional and personal disruption was reported as a result of making an error.  
Negative emotions were common, but positive feelings of determination, attentiveness and 
alertness were also identified.  Emotional response and coping strategy selection did not 
differ due to location or perceived harm, but responses did appear to differ by professional 
group; nurses in both locations reported stronger negative feelings after an error.  
Respondents favoured problem-focused coping strategies and associations were identified 
between coping strategy selection and the presence of particular emotions.  Organisational 
support services, particularly including peers, were recognised as helpful, but fears over 
confidentiality may prohibit some staff from accessing these. 
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Conclusions:  Clinicians in the UK and US experience professional and personal disruption 
after an error.  A number of factors may influence clinician recovery; these factors should be 
considered in the provision of comprehensive support programmes so as to improve clinician 
recovery and ensure higher quality, safer patient care.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Making a medical error can be a stressful and traumatic event for health professionals, 
causing significant distress.[1- 4] For this reason, health professionals have been described as 
second victims.[3, 4]. Following the publication of key white papers in the UK and US, the 
experiences of health professionals who have made medical errors have been widely 
documented across specialities and professions.[5 -11] Diverse measures have been used to 
explore the aftermath of error and these methodological inconsistencies are a key barrier to 
obtaining a comprehensive understanding of this experience.[2] Most studies have focused on 
assessing the negative emotions experienced, but work exploring the positive emotions that 
may underpin coping, learning and successful recovery from error has been limited. Current 
evidence indicates that the most effective coping strategies use error constructively to learn 
and make changes, but the interplay between emotion and coping after an error and the 
implications of this for providing appropriate support are not fully understood.[12, 13] The 
continuing demand for clinician support strategies has been highlighted recently, but the 
development of support mechanisms is limited by a lack of knowledge about what type of 
support may be helpful in the emotional recovery from error, the factors that influence 
coping, and whether a one size fits all approach is appropriate.[14] There is also an absence  
of cross-country research around this issue; much of the current work stems from the US and 
current literature indicates that there is been greater advancement in clinician support 
pathways in the US for affected clinicians than in the UK.[15]  Health care systems in the UK 
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and US differ; for example, physicians may be much more exposed to malpractice claims in 
the US which intensifies bad feeling after an error in comparison to the suits pursued at an 
organisational level in the UK. [16] It is important to understand what is happening in both 
locations to recognise how ideas and experiences can be shared and adapted to provide more 
effective support [17] 
 
Influential factors in the aftermath of medical error 
Medical errors vary in terms of the degree of potential or actual patient harm resulting 
from them. A ‘near-miss’ [or close call] describes “any event that could have had adverse 
consequences but did not, and was indistinguishable from fully-fledged adverse events in all 
but outcome” (e.g., incorrect potentially harmful drug drawn up but not administered, wrong 
drug prescribed to the patient but no harm resulted), whereas an ‘adverse event’ describes an 
error resulting in some degree of patient harm (e.g. wrong site surgery, harmful drug 
overdose).[17, 18] The level of patient harm resulting from an error has been proposed as an 
important and potentially influential factor in how health professionals feel about the mistake 
and how they cope; it seems likely that harmful errors resulting would be more distressing to 
the health professional, but this has not been sufficiently explored.[19] Review findings 
further suggest that physicians and nurses often respond differently to making a medical error 
(although both groups experience distress).[2] The reflective approach championed in 
nursing, whilst valuable, may be a source of anguish after a mistake as nurses consider their 
own role in the event.[7, 20,21,22] Physicians appear to prioritise factors such as professional 
loyalty and patient retention and have been described as more likely to avoid reflection, 
sometimes ignoring or denying an error, or in rare cases even colluding with colleagues to 
cover it up.[23, 24] Based on this evidence, the emotional response to making an error and 
the coping strategy selected may vary dependent on perceived  harm or professional group.   
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Whilst research on the impact of errors on clinicians has primarily identified negative 
emotions, positive feelings have also been reported in this context. Health professionals have 
described feeling empowered to assert safety concerns after a mistake and that their 
relationships with colleagues or patients improved if they felt well-supported, valued or 
trusted.[21, 25, 26] Literature exploring health professionals’ responses to workplace stress 
indicates that the emotions experienced in times of stress may be associated with the type of 
coping strategy selected. For example, amongst physicians, greater levels of emotional 
distress have been associated with the use of maladaptive coping strategies such as ignoring 
the stressor, keeping stress to oneself and focusing on something else.[27] These types of 
coping strategies can produce undesirable outcomes for both patients and health 
professionals.[28, 29] We therefore set out to gather preliminary data within this survey to 
explore whether the emotions experienced after making a medical error may be associated 
with the coping strategy used. 
 
Rationale 
This paper reports empirical cross-country work exploring the experiences of health 
professionals in the UK and US after making an error and extending the current literature by 
considering the factors that influence emotional response and coping strategy selection. 
Current work indicates that the negative emotions experienced are often a barrier to obtaining 
support after an error and that there is a lack of literature to form a consensus on how to 
effectively support health professionals. [15] The provision of support that facilitates the use 
of effective coping strategies has important implications for maintaining high safety 
standards and strong patient-practitioner relationships which can both be threatened when 
errors are made. [30] Understanding the factors that influence emotional recovery and coping 
strategy selection may be valuable to further inform the development of effective 
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organisational mechanisms to support health professionals; our findings are therefore 
considered in terms of the provision of staff support services.  
 
STUDY OBJECTIVES 
 
Self-reported survey data was used to explore: 
1) the professional and personal disruption reported after making a medical error 
2) the emotions that occur most commonly after making a medical error 
3) the coping strategies reported as used after making a medical error 
4) whether emotional response varies due to location, error severity and/or professional 
group  
5) whether coping strategy selection varies due to location, perceived  harm and/ or 
professional group 
6) whether there is any association  between the emotions experienced after making an 
error and the coping strategy selected  
7) awareness, perceptions of and willingness to use staff support services 
 
METHOD 
Ethical approval 
 Ethical approval was granted from the Yorkshire and Humber NHS Research Ethics 
Committee, UK, the Institute of Psychological Sciences at the University of Leeds, UK and 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Partners Healthcare (a consortium of several teaching 
hospitals of Harvard Medical School), Boston, USA. 
 
Survey tool 
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The Health Professional Experience of Error Questionnaire (HPEEQ) is a novel tool 
developed from a systematic review of the literature and drawing upon existing valid tools to 
describe different categories of error (terminology of the NPSA risk matrices), to assess 
emotion (Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule; PANAS) and coping strategies 
(Functional Dimensions of Coping Scale; FDC). [2, 31, 32] The questionnaire comprises four 
sections.  Section A collects minimal demographic data on job role and speciality. Section B 
gathers data about the error (including degree of perceived harm and time elapsed since its 
occurrence) and its perceived professional and personal impact through several single items 
draw from the systematic review findings of common experiences after making an error.  The 
emotions experienced in response to the error is assessed in section C through a validated 
measure of emotion (Positive and Negative Affectivity Schedule; PANAS) and a range of 
emotion items that were identified as connected with this experience in the systematic review. 
[31] Cronbach’s alpha confirmed that the multi-item emotion scale with the additional 
emotion items was internally reliable (α = .80). Section D assesses the coping strategies used 
via the FDC scale, a validated measure of coping. [32] Respondents list the activities and 
thoughts used to cope with making an error and these are scored on the extent to which they 
served each of four functions: approach, reappraisal, emotional regulation and avoidance 
(see Box 1 for definitions).  Respondents also indicated their awareness of local staff support 
services, perceptions of these services and willingness to use them.  The tool was piloted for 
relevance, comprehension and ease of use with a multi-professional sample of health 
professionals and only minor amendments were made as a result. 
 
BOX 1 HERE 
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Settings 
This study took place in two large teaching hospitals at the forefront of quality and 
safety initiatives and research: the Bradford Teaching Hospitals Foundation Trust (BTHFT), 
Bradford, UK and the Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH), Boston, USA.   
 
Recruitment 
Study information and invitations were distributed by 1) organisational newsletters; 2) 
e-mail distribution lists (US) and Trust intranet (UK), and 3) paper copies at training sessions 
or on wards.  Study invitations did not target specifically named potential participants.  In the 
absence of prior similar work, an a priori sample size calculation using G Power to test 
differences between professional group and perceived  harm on the 12 most commonly 
reported emotions and the four coping strategies was undertaken based on a small-medium 
effect size (0.20). The number of emotion items to be included as dependent variables were 
limited to the most commonly occurring to ensure that the analysis had the necessary 
power.[33] To power the analysis adequately (0.80), a minimum total sample size of 76 was 
required.[34]  
 
Sample 
A responder sample was used and a cross-section of health professionals was 
recruited in this way, but only data from the physicians and nurses were included because the 
sample sizes of the other health professions, despite being proportional, were too small to 
draw statistical comparisons.   
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Study design & procedure 
A cross sectional survey design was used to enable the statistical assessment of 
relationships between variables. Participants were presented with the study information sheet 
and consent form and completed an online or paper survey.  No identifiable information was 
gathered, surveys were completed confidentially, and paper copies were returned using 
freepost envelopes.  
 
ANALYTIC STRATEGY 
Initially, we proposed that there may be differences in the emotions and coping 
strategies of health professionals in the UK and US, but preliminary exploration of the 
correlation matrix revealed that scores on the emotion and coping measures were consistent 
across both locations; therefore, location was not included as a variable in these components 
of the analysis. Descriptive statistics were used to explore the reported professional or 
personal disruption after making an error, the types of errors that were reported, their 
perceived severity (some harm vs. no harm), and the frequency with which each emotion was 
experienced. A MANOVA explored differences between the two locations and professional 
groups on reported professional and personal impact.  Free text responses were used to 
provide additional detail; these components were used to identify the activities and thoughts 
used to cope and to gather greater detail regarding perceptions of the use of staff counselling 
in the event of a medical error.  Correlations were used to indicate whether the most common 
emotional responses appeared to be associated with particular coping strategies. A 
MANOVA was also used to determine whether the most commonly reported emotional 
responses or coping strategy selection differed dependent on perceived harm and/or between 
professions.   
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RESULTS 
Demographics and error characteristics 
The final sample (excluding five outliers to ensure findings were not misrepresented 
by extreme scores) comprised 120 physicians and 145 nurses (N = 265).  A response rate 
calculation was impossible due to the recruitment strategy adopted.  The UK sample included 
61 physicians and 65 nurses (N=126), and the US sample included 59 physicians and 80 
nurses (N=139). Respondents varied in terms of experience and seniority, and given the 
different labelling of professional roles in each location, were classed as either senior or 
junior within their profession. Senior physicians included consultants and attending 
physicians (50); junior physicians included house officers, senior house officers, registrars, 
interns, residents and fellows (70); senior nurses included band seven and eight nurses and 
nurse practitioners (49); and junior nurses were band five and six or registered nurses (96).   
All those that responded to the survey said they had been involved in an error. Around 
half of the errors reported had resulted in some degree of patient harm (43.5%), with major 
harm reported in 8.3% of cases. Where there was no patient harm, the potential for the error 
to result in harm was also perceived as quite likely across the sample, with a number of 
participants reporting potential harm to be ‘possible’, ‘likely’ or ‘almost certain’ (60.4%). 
The errors reported had occurred in the past six months (29.2%), between six months and five 
years ago (44.6%) and even more than five years ago (27.3%). Participants were asked to 
classify error type and could select more than one category. Treatment errors were reported 
most commonly (65.5%), but communication failures were often identified in conjunction 
with other mistakes (18.7%). The majority of errors were classified as ‘errors of execution’ 
(65.8%) rather than ‘errors of planning’ (34.2%). Almost half of the errors were perceived as 
being associated with deviation from policy (47.1%) and the remainder where this was not 
felt to be the case (52.9%). 
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Professional and personal disruption 
Professional and personal disruption was reported; around a third of the sample 
reported that their performance at work or their personal life had suffered at least moderately 
as a result of making a mistake, and that the error had created strained colleague 
relationships.  Participants overwhelmingly indicated that their attention to safety issues had 
increased to some extent after the error (83.8%) and just over half indicated they actually 
valued their relationships with colleagues more following an error (55.8%).   Organisational 
support after the error was generally considered adequate by (69.4%). 
Responses varied between locations, with UK respondents reporting a stronger impact 
on performance at work (F (1, 260) = 75.47, p<.001) and greater detriment to personal life (F 
(1, 260) = 9.51, p<.005).  US respondents indicated that both their attention to safety issues 
(F (1, 260) = 53.93, = p<.001), and the value placed on colleague relationships (F (1, 260) = 
9.96, = p<.005), increased substantially more than their UK counterparts after an error.  
Physicians across the sample reported significantly greater disruption to performance at work 
following an error (F, (1, 260) = 9.35, p<.005), whereas nurses indicated that their attention 
to safety issues following an error increased to a greater extent than physicians (F (1, 260) = 
31.16, p<.001). 
 
Emotional response to making an error  
Emotional responses were diverse. As expected, participants reported experiencing 
higher levels of negative emotions rather than positive emotions after making an error, and 
mean scores for all of the individual negative emotion items were generally higher on the five 
point scale (see Appendix 2 for descriptive statistics for all items). The negative emotions 
experienced most commonly were feeling upset ( x  = 3.64), guilty ( x  = 3.65), worried ( x  = 
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3.43), distressed ( x  = 3.18), scared ( x  = 3.02), nervous ( x  = 3.00), unhappy ( x  = 3.03), 
feelings of self-doubt ( x  = 3.19) and regret ( x  = 3.24). However, positive emotions of feeling 
determined ( x  = 2.71), alert ( x  = 2.84) and attentive ( x  = 2.55) were also reported. 
A significant difference between physicians and nurses was identified in terms of 
these most commonly reported emotions (F (15, 247) = 3.13, p<.001), particularly with 
regard to the following items: upset, worried, distressed, scared, and nervous for which 
nurses reported significantly higher scores (Table 1). No significant interaction was identified 
between emotional response, profession and severity of outcome which suggests that 
variations in emotional response between physicians and nurses were not subject to the 
degree of error severity of the outcome (F (1, 260) = .031, p = .861).  The types of emotional 
responses were not significantly different for incidents that caused harm compared to those 
that did not.   
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Coping strategy selection 
On average, participants tended to classify their coping behaviours as approach 
strategies ( x  = 3.63) and attempted to face up to the mistake and address the problem 
directly, for example by discussing the mistake with colleagues or superiors. In many cases, 
such activities were also classified as serving a ‘reappraisal’ function ( x  = 3.20) when the 
purpose of the discussion was to learn from the mistake. Coping activities that enabled health 
professionals to manage the anxiety and emotional distress of making a mistake were also 
described ( x  = 3.14) but to a slightly lesser extent. Activities serving an ‘avoidance’ function  
such as, taking leave from work or going on holiday were reported rarely ( x  = 1.15). Table 2 
provides examples of the coping strategies described in the free text. 
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TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient explored the relationship between the 
most common emotions and the use of each coping strategy. A positive correlation was 
identified between using emotional regulation to cope and feeling scared (r = .16, n = 265, 
p<.05), and also between the use of reappraisal strategies and feeling scared (r = .22, n = 265, 
p<.001), nervous (r = .14, n = 265, p<.05) and worried (r = .16, n = 265, p<.05). A negative 
correlation was identified between the use of approach coping strategies and feeling upset (r 
= -.13, n = 265, p<.05), and avoidance strategies were negatively associated with feeling 
interested (r = -.18, n = 265, p<.001), distressed (r = -.17, n = 265, p<.001) and upset (r = .16, 
n = 265, p<.05). A MANOVA indicated that coping strategy selection was not a function of 
perceived harm or professional group.  
 
Staff support services 
Of the 265 respondents, 53.6% were aware of organisational support services and 48.7% 
expressed willingness to use these services after an error. Although the potential value of 
staff support services was recognised, free text responses indicated that feelings of shame 
after an error and fears over confidentiality might act as a barrier to accessing support. Some 
respondents also indicated that support from a trusted existing source, such as a peer, may be 
preferential to a formal service.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper presents cross-country research highlighting the personal and professional 
impact of making a medical error and the range of coping strategies used. To our knowledge, 
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this is the first survey to assess the impact of making a medical error in both the UK and US 
and suggests that experiences are common across these two countries.  This is significant 
because many in the US assume that the fear of litigation is the principle driving force behind 
negative emotions after an error. Since the malpractice systems around clinical error in the 
two countries are different, the study suggests that litigation fear may not be as prominent a 
cause of negative emotions as was thought. In fact, those in the UK reported greater personal 
and professional disruption than their US counterparts. Emotional response was different for 
physicians and nurses, with nurses reporting stronger negative emotions after an error. 
However, there was no difference in the emotional response as a function of the level of 
patient harm. Findings also indicated that many health professionals are unaware of the 
organisational support services available but may be willing to access these services, 
particularly if these are led by peers and confidentiality can be ensured.   
Recognising and adequately supporting health professionals after an error is essential 
for promoting patient safety. A supportive environment is likely to facilitate the open and 
honest discussion of error, increasing error-reporting and consequently learning and 
development opportunities. [1, 35] Health care organisations may gain through reduced 
absenteeism and a greater sense of organisational commitment from their staff. Our survey 
findings are considered in the terms of the clinician impact literature and in relation to the 
provision of clinician support services at the study hospitals and more broadly. 
  
Emotion and coping after making an error 
Anxiety, distress and the self-conscious emotions of guilt and self-doubt were 
prevalent across the sample, but the positive emotions of feeling determined, alert and 
attentive were also reported. Whilst positive emotions were reported to a lesser extent than 
negative feelings, the positive emotions that received the highest scores appeared to indicate 
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an active recovery process in which individuals seek to learn and make changes to their 
practice after a mistake. Directly engaging in improving practice as a result of an error 
reflects the concept of ‘thriving’ after a mistake, which was identified in the trajectory of 
clinician recovery proposed by Scott et al. [36] Making an error may be a pivotal moment 
that presents a valuable opportunity to gather feedback on your own performance or that of 
your team. This is reflected in the current revalidation process being undertaken for 
physicians in the UK in which supporting information about errors and actions taken to 
improve care quality must be provided as part of the assessment process and maybe be a 
helpful strategy for supporting clinicians recovery from mistakes. [37]  
Nurses scored significantly higher on the intensity of many of the negative emotion 
items, particularly those emotions related to personal distress such as feeling upset, worried, 
distressed, scared or nervous. This finding suggests that a ‘one size fits all’ approach may not 
be the most effective.  Direct comparisons between the responses of physicians and nurses 
are limited, but literature to date suggests that nurses often experience strong feelings of self-
blame and personal accountability as a result of error that may make them vulnerable to 
greater personal distress. [21, 22]  Several explanations for this are possible: nurses may be 
more likely to be at the “sharp end of the error”; the greater intimacy and frequency of 
contact between nurse and patient may serve to heighten distress when things go wrong; 
nursing colleagues may be less forgiving of their peers; or a professional culture that inhibits 
emotional expression may have influenced physicians’ responses to this self-reported 
measure. [38, 39]  The finding that there was no difference in emotional response as a 
function of the degree of patient harm may appear counter intuitive, as it might be expected 
that greater patient harm would be linked to a stronger emotional response.  One possible 
explanation may be that when errors do not result in harm, health professionals may be less 
likely to be receive organisational or collegial support to cope with the experience.  A lack of 
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recognition that the health professional is affected by the error may therefore result in a 
stronger emotional response.   
A number of significant links indicated that there may be an association between 
emotions and coping after an error. The use of an ‘approach’ or problem-focused coping 
strategy that aims to address a mistake directly is widely regarded as preferable and was the 
most frequently reported in our sample. [39] Those who reported using an ‘approach’ strategy 
such as contacting a peer to discuss an error also reported feeling less upset after making a 
mistake, but it is unclear whether they felt less upset as a result of this strategy; or those who 
felt less upset were more able to face up to the mistake in this way; or that those who were 
willing to respond to this survey may be open and willing to think about their error. 
Moreover, the coping activities categorised by respondents as ‘approach’ strategies indicated 
a preference for turning to clinical peers for support rather than non-clinician colleagues, such 
as those in more formal settings e.g. mental health professionals.  These findings were 
consistent with previous work around physicians’ preferences for support for emotionally 
stressful events, including being involved in an adverse event. [40] A preference for clinical 
peer support was further confirmed through the responses of UK participants, as staff support 
in the NHS is provided by a generic staff counselling service as opposed to via clinician 
peers. UK respondents highlighted particular challenges around communicating concerns to 
someone who was not from a clinical background. In addition, the both studies identified 
several barriers to seeking support including confidentiality and fear of professional 
reputational harm.   
The coping literature consistently describes ‘avoidance’ strategies as maladaptive and 
unhelpful in a range of stressful or traumatic situations.[41] Here, somewhat surprisingly, 
‘avoidance’ strategies were associated with lower scores on the items ‘upset’ and ‘distressed’, 
but also on the item ‘interested’. This may reflect a blunting of emotional response which 
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enables individuals to adopt avoidant strategies (e.g. take time out from work, drink to forget 
about the event or not talk to others about the incident). It is certainly possible that some 
avoidance strategies are quite effective in the immediate aftermath of error.  It is also possible 
that initial avoidance strategies may serve to lessen the negative emotional response enough 
to give clinicians time for some emotional recovery and get some ‘emotional first aid’. [37] 
Further clarification of the direction of this relationship is necessary. 
The dynamic relationship between emotion and coping after an error is challenging to 
capture; the emotional response to making a mistake may lead to the selection of a particular 
coping strategy that, in turn, may elicit a further emotional response. Prospective or 
experimental study designs are needed to offer greater insight into these links and to 
understand the experiences of health professionals more fully. 
 
Limitations  
Self-reported, retrospective measures were selected due to ethical obstacles associated with 
capturing data in the aftermath of a medical error, but these may have been vulnerable to bias, 
particularly in recall and social desirability. The recruitment process also led to an element of 
self-selection as the strategies employed to make the survey available to as many potential 
participants as possible inhibited our ability to calculate an accurate response rate; we made a 
conscious decision to make the survey widely available and not send targeted surveys to 
those known to have been involved in an error or near.  It is possible therefore, that the 
attitudes and experiences of those who did not respond may have differed from our sample. 
Participants were asked to recall emotion and coping responses relating to previous error, but 
the ability to retrieve this episodic information regarding a discrete event declines quickly 
over time, rendering these reports subject to inaccuracies, particularly in the detail.[42-46] 
Current emotional state may also influence the reporting of emotions.[46] Despite these 
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limitations, there is consistent, powerful evidence that suggests emotionally charged 
memories are likely to be recalled more vividly, and this may be applicable to the experience 
of making a medical error.[47-51] Assessing the validity of the measurement tool in this 
relatively infant research area was challenging. Whilst pilot work provided face and content 
validity, we were unable to assess concurrent validity as there is no current validated measure 
that assesses the impact of making an error on health professionals nor is there agreement 
regarding the dimensions of the construct of ‘second victim’ to establish construct validity.    
 
Implications and application 
This work has important implications for the provision of staff support services in the 
aftermath of error. Effective management of the professional and personal disruption created 
is necessary to protect patients by ensuring that mistakes are reported to the institution and 
disclosed to patients, and to support and remediate clinicians where necessary. Emotions felt 
at the time of decision making are thought to override rational thought processes in moments 
of uncertainty; people rely on their gut feeling rather than weighing the pros and cons of a 
particular course of action.[51, 52] In the moment of realising an error and deciding what 
action to take, it is likely that strong feelings of personal shame, guilt and embarrassment 
may inhibit health professionals from reporting their mistakes, even when the benefits of 
error reporting for learning and improving safety are fully accepted.   Moreover, a full and 
frank disclosure to the patient and family may be inhibited if the emotional turmoil that 
clinicians, patients and families may be experiencing is not recognised and addressed.  
An effective clinician support program needs to take many factors into consideration.  
This study shows that clinicians feel both positive and negative emotions after making an 
error and that multiple coping strategies may be helpful in recovery. Clinicians should be 
given opportunities to avail themselves of various strategies, including speaking with peers, 
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being involved in systems changes to prevent future errors, and possibly taking some time off 
to recover from acute emotional distress.  Support should be easily accessible and 
confidential.  The Brigham and Women’s Hospital (BWH) has a robust peer support program 
that was developed and continues to improve based on a growing understanding of how best 
to help clinicians cope with adverse events.  Every clinician has access to peer support at 
BWH and over 60 clinicians have been trained as peer supporters. When notified of an 
adverse event, a trained physician or nurse colleague reaches out to offer support and to 
connect the clinician with other resources if needed, rather than waiting for the involved 
clinicians to either begin to suffer or to have to reach out on their own.  Group peer support is 
also available for teams involved in an emotionally stressful event.  A direct application of 
the study findings to improve this service is the identification of specific coping strategies 
that peer supporters may suggest to clinicians.  This work also highlights how negatively both 
nurses and physicians are affected by adverse events and the need to educate the entire 
healthcare community on the importance of a supportive environment after adverse events. 
None of this obviates the need for personal accountability and learning after errors.  In fact, 
this study reinforces the importance that individual learning and advocacy in improving care 
have on coping after being involved in an adverse event.  
An extrapolation from this and many other studies would suggest that helping support 
clinicians after adverse events might, in addition to preventing further errors and individual 
burnout, facilitate more transparent and compassionate disclosure.  For this reason, these 
findings have also informed the institution-wide disclosure and apology program that is 
closely linked to the peer support program at BWH.  Clinicians in this study revealed that 
speaking to patients about an error was one way in which they coped, but the use of such 
strategies indicates that clinicians must receive the necessary support outside the patient-
clinician relationship to ensure they do not look to their patients for consolation. 
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Emotional skills training may be one strategy to help raise clinicians’ awareness of 
the way that their emotions can affect the choices they make in patient care. [51] Such an 
approach may also be helpful for clinicians to recognise the impact of their emotions on the 
decisions made after an error, particularly when responding to an error and disclosing it to 
patients, families and colleagues.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Significant professional and personal disruption is reported after making a medical error by 
health professionals in both the UK and US, with important implications clinicians’ coping 
and recovery, and consequently, for patient safety. The findings have informed the 
development of both peer support as well as a disclosure and apology program at BWH. This 
work must be considered in terms of its conceptual and methodological limitations, but these 
do not limit the opportunities to use these findings to further explore the factors that may 
influence clinician response and recovery after error such as professional group and how staff 
support services can be delivered more effectively, taking into account such variations, to 
ensure optimal patient and clinician outcomes. 
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Appendix 1 Emotion Items 
PANAS Emotion Items  Additional Emotion Items  
Distressed Unhappy 
Upset Assertive 
Guilty Self-doubt 
Ashamed  Remorse 
Hostile Regret 
Irritable Humiliated 
Nervous Frustrated 
Scared Competent 
Afraid Shocked 
Jittery Resourceful 
Alert Smart 
Excited Fearful 
Attentive Worried  
Enthusiastic Effective 
Inspired Confident 
Determined Stupid 
Strong Worthless 
Active Frightened 
Interested Shame 
 Efficient 
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 Impatient 
 Shaky 
 Tense 
 Timid 
 Jealous 
 Thankful 
 Relieved 
 Trusted 
 Inadequate 
 Incompetent  
 Self-centred 
 Wise 
 Angry 
 Anxious 
 Panicky 
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Appendix 2 Descriptive statistics for individual emotion items 
Emotion item Mean Std. deviation Min. Max. 
Guilty 3.65 1.31 1 5 
Upset 3.64 1.26 1 5 
Resourceful 1.55 1.01 1 5 
Smart 2.40 1.43 1 5 
Fearful 2.66 1.48 1 5 
Worried  3.43 1.32 1 5 
Ashamed 3.21 1.46 1 5 
Determined 2.71 1.35 1 5 
Active 2.38 1.42 1 5 
Effective 2.03 1.23 1 5 
Confident 1.87 1.12 1 5 
Distressed 3.18 1.47 1 5 
Scared 3.02 1.46 1 5 
Competent 2.26 1.29 1 5 
Strong  1.97 1.12 1 5 
Hostile 1.62 1.04 1 5 
Stupid 2.51 1.47 1 5 
Efficient  2.07 1.24 1 5 
Worthless 2.00 1.23 1 5 
Frightened 2.54 1.45 1 5 
Shame 2.86 1.45 1 5 
Attentive 2.55 1.44 1 5 
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Impatient 1.77 1.15 1 5 
Irritable 2.09 1.19 1 5 
Inspired 1.64 1.10 1 5 
Alert 2.84 1.47 1 5 
Nervous 3.00 1.40 1 5 
Afraid 2.72 1.43 1 5 
Jittery 2.28 1.35 1 5 
Inadequate 2.28 1.35 1 5 
Incompetent  2.66 1.45 1 5 
Self-centred 2.64 1.47 1 5 
Panicky 1.38 .822 1 5 
Shaky 2.30 1.40 1 5 
Tense 2.16 1.35 1 5 
Timid 2.72 1.41 1 5 
Jealous 2.26 1.33 1 5 
Thankful 1.90 1.32 1 5 
Relieved 1.85 1.31 1 5 
Trusted 1.88 1.10 1 5 
Wise 1.66 .992 1 5 
Angry 1.15 .564 1 5 
Anxious 2.28 1.32 1 5 
Unhappy 3.03 1.42 1 5 
Assertive 1.85 1.14 1 5 
Self-doubt 3.19 1.45 1 5 
Remorse 2.82 1.50 1 5 
Regret 3.24 1.52 1 5 
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Humiliated 2.47 1.46 1 5 
Frustrated 2.89 1.47 1 5 
Shocked 2.88 1.50 1 5 
Interested 2.45 1.43 1 5 
Excited 1.37 .797 1 5 
Enthusiastic 1.62 1.13 1 5 
 
 
 
 
